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addition to its bibliographic record and abstract, may be available to a wider community 
of scholars and researchers through electronic access. 
2Introduction 
One of the most important rights guaranteed to Americans is in the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. That amendment states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging freedom of speech, or  
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
 the Government for a redress of grievances. 
This amendment is not only one of the most important rights, but one that is constantly 
being interpreted and defined in courtrooms across the country. Since the First 
Amendment was adopted as part of the Bill of Rights in 1791 court decisions have helped 
to develop its meaning.1  An issue of free speech came about in Portland, Oregon, 
recently when one man displayed his feelings about a new aerial tram that passed directly 
over his house. 
 In 2006 the City of Portland completed an aerial tram that connected the South 
Waterfront to the Oregon Health and Science University. The tram consists of two cars 
that can carry a maximum of 79 people per car. The cars depart about every five minutes 
during peak operating hours. The tram was built by the city to help connect the South 
Waterfront to the Marquam Hill, to help spur economic development due to OHSU’s 
recent expansions and to promote urban renewal.  
 While many people were excited about the new tram, many others were against it. 
One group of people that fiercely opposed the tram was the homeowners that lived 
directly under its path. Many of these homeowners were concerned that the tram would 
lower their property values and would also be an invasion of their privacy. The 
1 Don R. Pember, Clay Calvert. Mass Media Law. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 34 
3homeowners were concerned about the hundreds of people each day that would now be 
able to see into their previously private backyards. Due to these concerns, one 
homeowner decided to stand up and voice his opinion. 
 Justin Auld owned a home that was directly under the path of the new aerial tram. 
He was upset that his backyard, which had previously been private, could now be seen by 
any person riding the tram. Portland city officials had previously told Auld and his 
neighbors that this was not going to happen. After Auld discovered that people could in 
fact see into his backyard he decided to hang a sign on the roof of his house that 
expressed his feelings for the tram. In large, black letters on a white background the sign 
read: “FUCK THE TRAM.”2
 When people riding the tram saw the sign many thought it was funny, while 
others thought that it was tasteless. Portland city officials soon became involved and they 
told Auld that he was going to have to take the sign down. By April 27, 2007, the sign 
was taken down from the roof and hung on a nearby fence; the work fuck was folded 
underneath the sign so that it was hidden from view and only “THE TRAM” was legible. 
The city was successful in prohibiting Auld from expressing his feelings about the tram. 
 The Oregon Constitution even more broadly and clearly protects the rights of its 
citizens to free speech than the U.S. Constitution. Article one, section eight of the Oregon 
Constitution states,  
No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or
restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; 
 but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.  
2 Brian Barker and the KATU Web Staff, “Man Explains Why He Made F-bomb Tram Sign,” 
KATU Channel Two News, 26 April 2007. Accessed on 27 February 2009. www.katu.com 
4This constitutional right makes it impossible for any law to restrict speech solely based 
upon the vulgarity of words used.
 According to the preferred position balancing theory, the right to free expression 
guaranteed by the First Amendment and article one, section eight of the Oregon 
Constitution, is held at a higher status than all other societal concerns. In this case the 
government is trying to censor ideas that Auld has about the tram. This theory presumes 
that any action the government takes that limits freedom of expression to protect other 
interests in unconstitutional. “This presumption forces the government to bear the burden 
of proof in any legal action challenging censorship.”3  According to this theory the City 
of Portland must prove that their censorship of Auld’s sign is justified so that they are not 
violating the First Amendment and Article one, section eight of the Oregon Constitution.. 
 Another legal theory of the First Amendment that relates to this case is the 
Meiklejohnian theory. This theory states that “expression that relates to the self-
governing process must be protected absolutely by the First Amendment.”4 What this 
means is that political speech gets absolute protection. Ever since the tram was proposed 
it was a very contentious topic, not only among the area where Auld’s home is but 
throughout the greater Portland area. The tram was a political topic of debate, and under 
the Meiklejohnian theory, speech related to it should be given the fullest protection.
 The government is also restricted in the ways that it can enforce prior censorship 
on communication, such as laws that regulate signs and billboards. These are called time, 
3 Don R. Pember, Clay Calvert. Mass Media Law. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 44. 
4 Ibid., 45. 
5place and manner restrictions.5 The criteria that have been set is that rules must be 
content neutral, rules can not constitute a complete ban on a kind of communication, the 
rule must be justified by a substantial state interest, and the rule must be narrowly 
tailored.6
This study will examine the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
the freedom of speech rights provided in the Oregon Constitution, the Portland city sign 
statutes and time, place and manner restrictions. It will explore whether or not the City of 
Portland sign statutes violate constitutionally provided rights to free speech and 
expression. The purpose of this study is to weigh the city’s legitimate concerns to 
regulate signs in residential neighborhoods and its citizens from profanity versus Justin 
Auld’s right to express his ideas freely.
 The sign that Auld placed on his roof was on his private property and expressed 
his attitudes toward the tram that glided past his house. This paper will argue that when 
the City of Portland told Auld to take the sign down from his roof, it infringed on his 
constitutional right to freedom of speech as guaranteed by both the First Amendment and 
the Oregon Constitution.  
Facts of the Case
 Justin Auld was told by tram officials that the new aerial tram was not going to 
invade on his privacy. When the tram was finally built, he discovered that anyone riding 
on the tram would be able to see directly into his backyard. That was when Auld decided 
to do something about it.  
 Auld had a large sign professionally made that said in large black letters on a 
5 Don R. Pember, Clay Calvert. Mass Media Law. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 106. 
6 Ibid., 108. 
6white background “FUCK THE TRAM.” On April 23, 2007, Auld hung the sign on the 
roof of his house. The sign was clearly visible from the aerial tram, but it was not visible 
from the street. Due to the pitch of the roof, the sign could not be seen by other people in 
houses on the hill above Auld’s house.
 On April 27, 2007, Auld was told in a letter written from Portland city officials 
that his sign violated a city code that prohibited signs on single residential houses. That 
city ordinance is located in title 32 of the Portland city code and charter. The specific 
subsection the city cited that Auld was in violation of is in subsection 32.32.010. That 
subsection states that houses, duplexes and attached houses are only allowed one sign per 
property and that sign can only have a maximum sign face area of one square foot. Signs 
are also not allowed to be placed higher than ten feet.7 Auld was informed that if he did 
not take the sign down by May 14, 2007, he was going to be fined $50 per day.8
 On the day Auld received the letter from the City of Portland he decided to take 
the sign off his roof. Auld then placed the sign on a nearby fence. Auld was then told by 
city officials that due to the same code as previously stated that he was not allowed to 
keep the sign anywhere on his property where it could be visible to the public.  
  Because of all the media coverage, Auld decided to take the sign down without 
fighting the city to keep it up. The sign had been shown on various television news 
stations, including KATU, and local newspapers such as The Oregonian. “I had made my 
point,” Auld said. Auld was happy that because of all the media coverage on local 
television news stations many more people than he had expected were able to see the sign 
7  See Appendix I: 32.32.010 Standards in the Residential Zones and Open Space Zone.  
8 Benjamin Brink. “No Fan of the Tram.” The Oregonian, 28 April  2007. 
7and how he felt about his loss of privacy.
Case Law Analysis 
Time, Place and Manner Restrictions 
 In a series of decisions the United States Supreme Court has said that the 
government can exercise prior restraint on certain types of communication based on the 
time, place or manner of the communication if there is a substantial state interest. To be 
able to do this the rules the government puts into place must meet a set of four criteria so 
that no First Amendment rights are violated.  
 The first criterion states that, “the rule must be neutral as to content, or what the 
courts call content neutral, both on its face and in the manner in which it is applied.”9
This means that it does not matter what is said or printed, but the rule must apply equally 
to all communications. An example of a law that was found by the courts to be a violation 
of this criterion was when a town passed an ordinance that prohibited property owners 
from placing political signs on their property, unless it was within 30 days before an 
election. This law was not content neutral because it only regulated political speech and 
not other types of signs.10 If an ordinance does not meet this criterion then it could be 
subject to the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review that requires the government to 
prove not just a substantial state interest, but a compelling state interest.
The second criterion states that rules must not constitute a complete ban on a kind 
of communication. An example of this criterion being violated can be found in several 
9  Don R. Pember, Clay Calvert. Mass Media Law. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 106. 
10  Whitton v. Gladstone, 354 F. 3d 1400 (1995). 
8court rulings. In one case a city statute banned exit polling that was being conducted by 
the local newspaper. This statute was struck down because the statute would constitute a 
complete ban on a specific type of communication. Reporters trying to find out 
information of voter turnout would not be able to get the same information elsewhere.11
For a ban to not violate the First Amendment there must be other ways of accomplishing 
the same communication. 
 The third criterion states that there must be a substantial state interest to justify the 
restraint on speech. For example, there have been attempts by cities to ban the 
distribution of pamphlets because they can create a litter problem. The courts decided that 
this is not considered a legitimate concern because the litter can be dealt with by other 
means, such as enforcing anti-litter laws.12 On the other hand, a ban on the use of 
loudspeakers after 10 p.m. could be justified because people are trying to sleep at that 
hour of the night, which is a substantial state interest. The city, state or federal law that 
applies to restraint on speech must have a legitimate reason to justify that the restraint in 
necessary.13
 The forth criterion that must be met is that, “the law must be narrowly tailored so 
that is furthers the state interest that justifies it, but does not restrain more expression than 
is actually required to further this interest.”14 In one case that dealt with this criterion, a 
city passed an ordinance that banned the distribution of free, printed material in yards, 
driveways and porches in an attempt to stop a particular newspaper from cluttering up 
11 Don R. Pember, Clay Calvert. Mass Media Law. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 107. 
12 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); and Miller v. Laramie, 880 P. 2d 594 (1994). 
13 Daily Herald v. Munro, 838 F. 2d 380 (1988). 
14 Don R. Pember, Clay Calvert. Mass Media Law. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 108-09. 
9gutters and streets. Instead of just preventing the problematic paper, the ordinance also 
prevented any free material from being distributed in the same manner. For this reason 
the law was not narrowly tailored because as it restrained more expression than was 
actually required to further the state’s interest. The city could have instead required 
people to pick up their papers or fined the paper for any unclaimed papers.15
 A law that deals with prior restrain due to time, place and manner needs to be able 
to meet all of these criteria so that it does not violate the First Amendment. Depending 
upon where the speech in question is taking place determines the manner in which the 
court may apply the four criterions.16
Oregon State Constitution 
“Over the past 50 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has given the states broad 
latitude to set their own laws regarding free speech.”17 Because of this the laws that 
govern the freedom of expression vary considerably from state to state. Article one, 
section eight of the Oregon Constitution states that: 
No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or 
restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject 
whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this 
right.18
With these words the framers of the Oregon Constitution gave their citizens even more 
free speech rights than those provided by the U.S. Constitution. Oregon’s guarantee of 
15  Don R. Pember, Clay Calvert. Mass Media Law. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 109. 
16  Ibid., 110. 
17 ACLU of Oregon. “A Closer Look at Free Speech.” Accessed on 16 March 2009. http://www.aclu-
or.org/site/PageServer?pagename=Iss_free 
18 Oregon State Legislature. “Constitution of Oregon.” Accessed on 6 March 2009. http://www.leg.state.or. 
us/orcons/orcons.html 
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free speech is actually considered one of the broadest in the country. It is also considered 
to be one of the strongest constitutional guarantees of free speech.19
 Because Oregon’s constitutional guarantee of free speech is so broad, there are 
many ongoing controversies arising from it. 
Past Cases: Signs 
 In 1994 the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with a case that is strikingly similar to 
that of Auld’s; that case involved Margaret Gilleo. Gilleo, who owned a single-family 
home in Ladue, Missouri, put a 24 by 36-inch sign on her front lawn that said, “Say No to 
War in the Persian Gulf, Call Congress Now.” Soon after Gilleo put up the sign, it 
disappeared. She then put up another sign, but that one also disappeared. Gilleo reported 
the incidents to the police but was informed by then that signs of that nature were 
prohibited inside of city limits.20
 Gilleo decided to take action, and the District Court issued a preliminary 
injunction against the city ordinance that prohibited her from displaying her sign. After 
the injunction Gilleo placed an 8.5 by 11-inch sign in her window that read, “For Peace in 
the Persian Gulf.” The City of Laude responded by repealing the old city ordinance, 
which the court had placed an injunction on, and enacted a new, revised city ordinance. 
This ordinance prohibited all residential signs, allowing for only 10 exemptions such as 
residential identification signs and “for sale” signs. Gilleo then amended her complaint to 
challenge the new ordinance.21 This is a violation of one of the guidelines for time, place 
19 ACLU of Oregon. “A Closer Look at Free Speech.” Accessed on 16 March 2009. http://www.aclu-
or.org/site/PageServer?pagename=Iss_free 
20 City of Laude v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
21Ibid. 
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and manner restrictions because these exemptions make the ordinance not content 
neutral.
 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Gilleo by ruling that the city ordinance 
violated her First Amendment guarantee to freedom of expression. Justice John Paul 
Stevens delivered the opinion of the court.
 Stevens wrote, “Ladue has almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of 
communication that is both unique and important.” 22 Signs that express a view or react 
to a local controversial issue reflect and animate changes in the life of the community
Residential signs have long been an important medium for expression.  
.
The City of Laude argued that the ordinance was a regulation of time, place and 
manner because residents were still capable of using other mediums to express their 
ideas. The court addressed this concern by stating that residential signs are often a cheap 
and convenient form of communication, especially for people who have limited mobility 
or modest means. Other forms of communication such as printing leaflets or taking out 
advertising space in a newspaper may be far too costly for many people to do. Activities 
such as handing out the leaflets and holding protests or speeches may also be 
unreasonable for people who have disabilities preventing them from doing so. Also, 
residential signs are meant to reach a certain audience that might not be able to be 
reached as effectively by any other means.23
The government does have the right to impose regulations on signs in residential 
22 City of Laude v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
23  Ibid.  
24  Ibid. 
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neighborhoods if they have legitimate concerns, but the city’s ordinance prohibiting all 
signs violated the First Amendment. With more “temperate measures,” the City of Laude 
could satisfy their regulatory needs without violating their citizens’ right to free speech.24
Past Cases- Expletives 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has also dealt with issues arising from offensive 
messages, or for lack of a better term, swearwords. In 1971a 19-year-old named Paul 
Cohen wore a jacket that expressed his ideas about the Vietnam War. The jacket was 
emblazoned with the words “Fuck the Draft. Stop the War.” He was charged under a 
California statute, convicted, and sentenced to 30 days in jail. The statute prohibited,
“maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person 
[by] offensive conduct.”25 The court found that although the phrase on the jacket is 
provocative, it is not directed at any one person. There was also no evidence that “people 
in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words 
on his jacket.”26 There was no evidence that anyone who saw the jacket, or was likely to 
see it, could have reasonably regarded the words as an insult because the message was 
not directed at any one person. 27
 The court also made a distinction between the use of vulgar language and 
obscenity, which the government has been given more power to regulate. For a state to 
use its “power to prohibit obscene expression, such expression must be, in some 
25  Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). 
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid.   
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significant way, erotic.”28
 The State of California made the argument that the state had a legitimate concern 
to act because the “distasteful” remark was thrust unwillingly upon its viewers. This 
argument was not held by the court because there was no intrusion of privacy.  The 
government’s ability to stop dialogue solely in the interest of protection other from 
hearing is “dependent upon showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded 
in an essentially intolerable manner.”29
Discussion 
 The type of speech that Auld displayed on his roof was political speech. Even if 
people did not like the expletive he used, there is no doubt that the topic he was referring 
to was a highly contentious issue for the people living in his area and around the Portland 
metropolitan area. The Meikeljohnian theory of the First amendment states that political 
speech should get absolute protection, while all other types of speech must be balanced 
with other societal concerns.30 What makes this statute unconstitutional is that it does not 
meet the criteria set forth for time, place and manner restrictions. 
 The Portland city statute that regulates signs in residential areas does meet the 
first criterion in that the law is content neutral. The statute does not have any language 
that provides a guideline for what types of language is or is not allowed. There is also no 
sign ordinance that states that expletives are or are not permitted. In fact, the statute 
prohibits all signs that have a face area larger than one square foot. The statute also 
28  Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). 
29  Ibid. 
30 Don R. Pember, Clay Calvert. Mass Media Law. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 45. 
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prohibits signs that are placed higher than ten feet off the ground.31
 The statute is also an almost complete ban on residential signs. For many 
properties in Portland, a sign that is smaller than one square foot would not be able to be 
legible from the street. In Laude v. Gilleo Justice Stevens wrote in his opinion that signs 
are a valuable means of communication for many people. For many, signs are cheap, easy 
to use and for people with disabilities or financial restraints, can be the only way to 
effectively communicate their ideas. “[R]esidential signs have long been an important 
and distinct medium of expression.”32 This statute almost completely bans this entire type 
of communication, which makes it a violation of this time, place and manner criterion.  
 This statute also does not meet the third and fourth criterions of time, place and 
manner restriction, that the law must justify a substantial state interest and the law must 
be narrowly tailored as to not restrain more expression than is required to further its 
interest.33 The City of Portland’s interest in protect unlimited proliferation of residential 
signs which might create “visual clutter” is not enough of a substantial state interest to 
prohibit such an important means of communication. The Supreme Court has ruled that in 
situations like this there are more temperate measures a city can use to satisfy their 
interest in regulation visual clutter.34
Conclusion
 As the Portland statute which regulates residential signs stands today, all signs on 
houses, duplexes and attached houses cannot have a face area larger than one square foot. 
31 See Appendix I: 32.32.010 Standards in the Residential Zones and Open Space Zone. 
32  City of Laude v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
33  Don R. Pember, Clay Calvert. Mass Media Law. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 109. 
34  City of Laude v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
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This means that people would not be able to have “Happy Birthday” banners, “It’s a 
Boy” signs or even house identification number signs larger than one square foot.
By taking away our right to have signs with a face area larger than one square 
foot, statute 32.32.010 also prohibits one of the most common forms of political speech. 
Under this law it is technically illegal to fly the standard size United States flag on private 
property. In our democratic form of society political speech is one of the greatest rights 
we are all guaranteed. “The guarantee of freedom of speech and freedom of the press 
were added to the Constitution in large measure to protect political debate in the nation 
from government interference.”35
Another freedom this statute infringes upon is the right to support candidates for 
public office. Many Americans choose to do this by placing signs in their windows and 
on their lawns during a candidate’s campaign, but city statute 32.32.010 prohibits these 
signs if they have a face area larger than one square foot. Because this statute is 
prohibiting political speech, it is certainly unconstitutional. “[P]olitical speech is at the 
top of the First Amendment hierarchy of expression.”36 This means that political speech 
is given the highest priority for protection under the First Amendment. 
Even if the City of Portland was trying to protect its citizens from vulgar language 
with this statute there are no substantial privacy interest that Auld is invading upon, 
which is the only reason the government can use to stop dialogue solely in the interest of 
protecting others from hearing it.37 In fact it is Auld’s privacy that the city invaded upon.  
The statute that the City of Portland cited in Auld’s case does not meet three of 
35 Don R. Pember, Clay Calvert. Mass Media Law. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 609. 
36 Ibid., 541. 
37 Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). 
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the criterions for time, place and manner restrictions which makes the statute 
unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Oregon Constitution. 
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Appendix I
(The following is a copy of code 32.32.010 as listed on the Online Code and Charter from 
the Portland City Auditors Office.) 
32.32.010 Standards in the Residential Zones and Open Space Zone.
A. General standards. The standards for permanent signs in the RF through RH zones and 
for the IR and OS zones are stated in Table 1. The sign standards for the RX zone are 
stated in Table 2. All signs must conform to the regulations of Section 32.32.030. 
B. Sign features. Signs in the RF through RH zones and in the IR and OS zones, except 
for those subject to the CN zone sign standards, are subject to the standards of this 
subsection. Illuminated signs placed in windows are subject to these sign regulations. 
Extensions into the right-of-way are prohibited. Changing image sign features are 
prohibited and only indirect lighting is allowed. 
18
